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Abstract
Revolutionary vanguards, their radicalism and coercive actions, and their interactions with
ordinary citizens and the state are common threads in narratives of revolutionary move-
ments. But what are the defining features of revolutionary vanguards? The literature is re-
plete with terms that allude to some notion of a revolutionary vanguard (e.g., revolutionary
entrepreneurs, entrepreneurs of violence, early-risers), but the essence of these conceptions
and their implications for revolutionary process remain obscure. We identify and differenti-
ate the two main notions of vanguards, the Leninist and “early-riser” notions, and develop
a formal framework that captures their distinguishing features, deriving their implications
for the likelihood of revolution. We then use this framework to study three related and
overlooked topics: (a) state strategies in mitigating the vanguard’s influence on citizens; (b)
citizens’ preferences for the degree of vanguard radicalism; and (c) the vanguards’ use of
coercion against citizens.
Keywords: Vanguard, Revolution, Radicalism, Coercion, Coordination, Learning, Option to
Delay.
JEL Classification: D74, D82, H00.
1 Introduction
Who are revolutionary vanguards, what roles do they play in revolutionary movements, and
what is the nature of their interactions with the state? Lenin, in What Is to be Done?,
envisioned them as professional revolutionaries, skilled in resisting the state and organiz-
ing the masses. Others consider vanguards as “early-risers” who come to streets before
others (Tarrow 2002), potentially creating a snow-ball effect that topples a regime (Ku-
ran 1991; Lohmann 1994; Pearlman 2016). Complicating matters, the literature uses a
plethora of names to allude to some notion of a revolutionary vanguard (e.g., revolution-
ary entrepreneurs, or entrepreneurs of violence). However, the essence of these notions and
their implications for revolutionary process remain unstudied, hindering the understanding
of the roles of vanguards in revolutions and the nature of their interactions with the state
and citizens. Our paper develops a framework to capture the essence of the two main no-
tions of vanguards and investigates their implications for regime change. We then use this
framework to glean insights into three related and overlooked topics: (a) state strategies
in mitigating a vanguard’s influence on citizens; (b) citizens’ preferences for the degree of
vanguard radicalism; and (c) a vanguard’s use of coercion against citizens.
A key differentiating feature in various conceptions of a vanguard is whether a vanguard is
distinguished from other citizens by its knowledge of the know-hows of “protest technology,”
access to organizational resources (e.g., religious funds or networks), or its skills in initiating
anti-regime activities such as protests or armed attacks. This is Lenin’s idea of a vanguard,
which closely resembles the notions of political entrepreneurs and entrepreneurs of violence
in the social movements literature (Della Porta 1995; McAdam et al. 2001; Tilly and Tarrow
2007) and revolutionary entrepreneurs in formal models of revolutions (Bueno de Mesquita
2010; DeNardo 1985; Shadmehr 2015). The vast social movements literature highlights that
sustaining a movement requires skilled activists who engage in extensive planning and coor-
dination that typically cannot be provided by spontaneous contentious actions (Tarrow 2002;
Tilly 1996, 2004; see also Goldstone (2001) and Morris and Staggenborg (2004)).1 In contrast,
1A large literature traces the critical role of skilled activists in movements that may seem spontaneous.
Morris’s (1984) classical study of the U.S. civil rights movement, and Khatib and Lust’s (2014) study of the
role of activists in the Arab Spring are two examples. The Leninists were convinced of the necessity of skilled
revolutionaries. For example, in his History of the Russian Revolution, Trotsky (1932) discards the “kingdom
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in the alternative “early riser” notion of vanguards, the vanguards are not skilled revolution-
aries; rather, they emerge organically in the protest process as those citizens who protest
first, for example, based on their assessments of the risks and rewards of the protest. A key
goal of this paper is to identify the differences in the outcomes of revolution that arise from
the presence of established, skilled vanguards versus the emergence of endogenous, organic
vanguards. We discuss, in turn, the Leninist and early-riser models of a vanguard, and the
consequences of each model for revolutions, highlighting our methodological contributions in
our review of the literature, and delineating our substantive contributions in the Conclusion.
The key element of the Leninist notion of a vanguard is that a skilled vanguard must
lead for a revolution to succeed. To capture this feature, we assume that a representative
professional vanguard first decides whether to revolt. Then, a representative citizen observes
the vanguard’s action and chooses whether to provide support.2 The status quo prevails
unless both the vanguard and citizen revolt, and a solo revolter is punished by the regime.
The payoffs from successful revolution can be decomposed into a certain component that
captures how the vanguard’s preferences differ from the citizen’s—a more radical vanguard
derives a higher payoff from successful revolution than the citizen3—and an uncertain com-
ponent that both the vanguard and citizen share. To capture the fact that the vanguard
does not have a monopoly over information, we assume that both the vanguard and citizen
receive private signals about the uncertain component of revolution payoffs.
Because the vanguard must decide whether to act before the citizen, it cannot directly
base its choice on the citizen’s signal. Instead, the vanguard must rely on the information
of spontaneousness,” arguing that “to the question, who led the February revolution? we can then answer def-
initely enough: Conscious and tempered workers educated for the most part by the party of Lenin” (p. 152).
2We abstract from coordination among citizens, which has been well studied in the literature. Coordina-
tion arises in the Leninist model because a vanguard cares about coordinating its actions with a representative
citizen. Moreover, that the game begins with the vanguard’s decision does not preclude earlier anti-regime
activities by other citizens. Model parameters can capture the consequences of such unmodeled interactions.
For example, when such actions reveal information about revolution payoffs, that information is included in
the priors of agents; and if such preceding actions reduce the likelihood of punishment by the regime, they are
captured by varying the expected payoffs. Our goal is to focus instead on the essential feature of the Leninist
professional-revolutionary notion of vanguards that a skilled vanguard must lead for a revolution to succeed.
3For example, Khomeini’s followers valued an Islamic Republic more than many citizens who supported
them in the Iranian Revolution. Alternatively, a vanguard may hold more optimistic prior beliefs about the
payoffs from successful revolution. For example, Lenin’s followers shared his belief that, following a Bolshevik
Revolution in Russia, European workers would revolt and end WWI; Lenin reiterated this theory on many
occasions, including his April Theses and The Tasks of the Proletariat (Lenin 1964, p. 67; Harding 1996).
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contained in the citizen’s equilibrium choice of whether to provide support; and the vanguard
knows that the revolution cannot succeed unless it initiates revolt. In contrast, the citizen
bases his action on both his own signal, and the vanguard’s decision of whether to initiate
revolt. The strength of the information contained in the vanguard’s choice to revolt rises
when the vanguard is more reluctant to revolt—which, in turn, makes the citizen more willing
to revolt. We show that as a result, in equilibrium, the vanguard revolts and the citizen
provides support whenever their assessments of the merits of revolution are sufficiently high—
given standard conditions, the equilibrium is unique and is in cutoff strategies. Moreover, in
contrast to settings without an established revolutionary vanguard (which always features an
equilibrium with no revolution), the probability of a successful revolution is always positive.
We use the Leninist framework to provide foundations for understanding the sources of a
vanguard’s ideological radicalism, and state actions to contain the threat of revolution. We
first consider a state that seeks to minimize the probability of regime change. Obviously, a
state would like to face a conservative vanguard that is very reluctant to overturn the status
quo. So, too, it would like to catch and harshly punish any vanguard after a failed revolt—
as then a vanguard is very unlikely to initiate revolt. But what should a state do if it can
neither anoint a puppet as a leader (e.g., a faux union leader), nor punish so harshly? The
state’s problem is subtle. A more radical vanguard revolts after worse information about
revolution payoffs. But then the citizen needs better signals about revolution payoffs to be
willing to provide support. Thus, a more radical vanguard revolts more, but is less likely to
have a following.
We show that a state may be better off with an extremely radical vanguard than with a
moderate vanguard; and it may be better off not punishing leaders of a failed revolt than pun-
ishing moderately. This result provides a rationale for why Assad “funded and co-operated
with al-Qaeda in a complex double game even as the terrorists fight Damascus” (Telegraph,
20 Jan 2014). So, too, it sheds light on why a regime might implement light punishments for
leaders of a failed revolt. For example, in the early 1960s when Khomeini first openly crit-
icized the Shah, the Pahlavi regime only briefly kept him under arrest, even as it responded
harshly to protesters on the streets. When, after his release, Khomeini again denounced the
Shah, he was only forced into exile (Milani 1994; Parsa 1989, 1994).
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We next observe that regimes are not the only actors with a stake in determining a van-
guard’s radicalism. Citizens also care, and their decisions of which potential vanguards to
promote can effectively select vanguards with their desired radicalism. We show that the
representative citizen prefers a more radical vanguard to offset the effects of harsher pun-
ishment for failed revolt, or when the citizen’s own status quo payoff is lower. Indeed, if
the status quo deteriorates below a critical threshold, moderate citizens prefer very radical
vanguards who always revolt even though this blocks information-flow from vanguards to
citizens about the merits of the post-revolution regime. This result can reconcile sudden
surges of support for radical vanguards that sometimes occur; for example, in the years just
preceding the Iranian Revolution, Khomeini’s support rose dramatically at the expense of
more moderate opposition (Katouzian 1981; Mottahedeh 1985).
Having analyzed two selection sources of a vanguard’s radicalism, we explore how a van-
guard’s radicalism may affect its interactions with citizens, focusing on a vanguard’s use of
coercion. In settings such as civil wars or guerrilla movements, a vanguard can punish a
citizen who does not follow its lead, for example burning villages that do not cooperate. A
vanguard’s strategic considerations are subtle: with a more compliant citizen, a vanguard
faces less risk of a failed revolt; but a more compliant citizen also supports change even when
his private information indicates that the vanguard is “mistaken.” This reduces a vanguard’s
ability to protect against outcomes that could be worse than the costs of revolting alone, for
example, protecting against a successful revolution that “devours its own,” as happened to
the Jacobins in the French Revolution and the Marxists in the Iranian Revolution (Abra-
hamian 1982, 1999; Brinton 1965). We show that, as a result, a vanguard never wants to
coerce a citizen too harshly. The logic is that a vanguard wants a citizen to take whatever
action the vanguard would given the citizen’s information. Thus, the more radical is the
vanguard, the more coercion the vanguard wants to use. Paradoxically, a citizen can benefit
from a vanguard’s use of coercion, as it makes the vanguard more willing to initiate revolt.
Extending this logic, we show that if, rather than having common beliefs about the infor-
mational structure, a vanguard has more confidence in its knowledge than does the citizen,
then it employs harsher coercion. This result highlights that the source of extreme coercive
measures by vanguards is not that they believe they know far more than other citizens,
but rather that they believe that other citizens do not understand how much they know.
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This also suggests why ideological vanguards (e.g., Bolsheviks) or clandestine revolutionary
organizations tend to use more coercive measures. Those with faith in a world-view tend
to be overconfident about their knowledge; and clandestine revolutionary organizations with
limited outside contacts tend to over-weight their comrades’ views as independent rather
than correlated evaluations (Della Porta 2013; Levy and Razin 2015).
The other prevailing notion of revolution is the early-riser model of vanguards. To an-
alyze this early-riser model we discard the Leninist premise that a revolution fails without
the leadership of an established revolutionary vanguard. We consider two ex-ante identical
representative citizens who receive private signals about payoffs from successful revolution.
Crucially, either citizen can lead—no group has a “technological advantage” in leading revolt.
Each citizen has two chances to act. By initiating revolt at date 1, a citizen can endoge-
nously assume the mantle of a leader, revealing that he has good news about the revolution.
Alternatively, a citizen can wait to see what the other citizen did, and base date-2 decisions
on this information.
Analysis of the early-riser model is challenging, and constitutes our primary methodolog-
ical contribution. Without an established vanguard, citizens face conflicting signaling and
free-riding incentives. Citizens have incentives both to lead, risking punishment to convey a
positive signal about revolution payoffs and deliver a successful revolution; and to delay, in or-
der to free ride on the information conveyed by the other’s actions, and avoid punishment for
leading a failed revolt. We show that an established vanguard is always more likely to initiate
revolt than is any citizen in the early-riser model.4 This is because in the Leninist model, the
revolution cannot succeed unless the vanguard acts. The flip side of the relative reluctance
of an organic leader to revolt is that it raises the good news conveyed by his action. Thus,
it is more attractive to support an organic leader than an established vanguard. This infor-
mational logic has a sharp implication: Revolutions that begin organically are more likely
to succeed. A numerical analysis further suggests that when leaders emerge organically the
likelihood of successful revolution is higher unless the punishment for failed revolt is small.
Literature. Our main methodological contribution is to analyze the endogenous emergence
of vanguards, which we are the first to study. This analysis is tangentially related to research
4Revolution may still be more likely in the early-riser setting because both citizens can initiate revolt.
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on dynamic global games (Angeletos et al. 2007). The closest is Dasgupta’s (2007) analysis of
delay in a threshold global game of investment. In Dasgupta’s model, players trade off higher
potential returns for better information; there is no payoff uncertainty, the cost of delay is
exogenous, and a player’s action does not influence outcomes. Thus, neither the tradeoff
between signaling and free-riding nor learning-in-equilibrium considerations—both of which
are central in revolution settings—arise. Our second point of departure is our emphasis on
the common value nature of revolution payoffs, which gives rise to learning-in-equilibrium
incentives. The literature focuses on a leader who has more information than others and at-
tempts to credibly convey this information to potential followers. However, as Shadmehr and
Bernhardt (2011) note, uncertainty about common value payoffs is an essential feature of rev-
olutions. An implication is that a vanguard, too, can benefit from the information of citizens.
Thus, in our model, one of the vanguard’s key strategic considerations is learning the citizen’s
information via the information content of their equilibrium behavior.5 These common value
and learning-in-equilibrium features underlie our substantive results on (a) state strategies
in mitigating a vanguard’s influence on citizens; (b) citizens’ preferences for the degree of
vanguard radicalism; and (c) a vanguards’ use of coercion against citizens, where we analyze
how a vanguard uses coercion to render a following without excessively blocking equilibrium
learning that can protect against outcomes that are even worse than the status quo.
Bueno de Mesquita (2010) studies the signaling role of vanguards. A vanguard moves first
and exerts costly efforts to foment violence, which is observed by citizens who then decide
whether to revolt. The intensity of violence is a noisy public signal of anti-regime sentiments,
and the vanguard’s effort reduces strategic risk, facilitating coordination by citizens—see also
Loeper et al. (2014). Lipnowski and Sadler (2017) show that in a star network centered on a
leader, the leader’s decision to protest convinces players of each others’ intentions to act, gen-
erating a unique peer-confirming equilibrium. Morris and Shadmehr (2017) study a leader’s
optimal design of rewards from successful revolution. Bueno de Mesquita (2013) studies a
leader’s the choice of regular vs. irregular tactics. DeNardo (1985) and Shadmehr (2015)
5To capture these uncertain common value payoffs, we structure of our Leninist model of vanguards so that
it is the sequential analogue of the simultaneous game analyzed in Shadmehr and Bernhardt (2011) with a
more general payoff and information structure—our Lemma 2 generalizes their best response characterization.
Proposition 1 shows that the sequential timing structure ensures existence of an equilibrium with revolution
and restores equilibrium uniqueness (see Morris (2014) for a general discussion). There is no overlap between
these two papers in content beyond this contrast in the existence and uniqueness of finite-cutoff equilibria.
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study a leader’s choice of revolutionary agenda.6 More broadly, a leadership literature has
focused on the “leader as communicator.” In Hermalin (1998), the leader is a team member
with more information about the returns to effort, who tries to credibly signal this informa-
tion to other members to induce them to work harder. Dewan and Myatt (2007) study the
effect of a leader’s public signal on the outcome of a party conference where players must
coordinate on two potential outcomes.
A few papers study leadership in the beauty contest framework of Morris and Shin
(2002), where players care about both coordinating actions and targeting the state of the
world, about which they have private information. In Landa and Tyson (2017), an informed
but biased leader wants followers to take her desired action, and followers incur exogenous
costs of deviating from a leader’s announced action directive. Bolton et al. (2013) extend the
beauty contest framework to allow for bottom-up information flow via the leader’s observa-
tion of the aggregate actions of followers. We abstract from the role of leaders in enhancing
coordination among followers, which has been the subject of many studies, and focus on the
novel aspects, described above, that have received minimal attention.
2 A Leninist Model of Vanguardsb
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Figure 1: Vanguard-citizen Game. R indicates revolt and ¬R indicates no revolt.
A representative vanguard and a representative citizen (follower) sequentially decide
whether or not to revolt. The vanguard moves first and the citizen moves second. Fig-
6The literature on protest and revolution has mainly focused on citizen coordination and a state’s
manipulation of information (Barbera and Jackson 2016; Casper and Tyson 2014; Chen and Suen 2017;
Edmond 2013; Egorov et al. 2009; Egorov and Sonin 2017; Shadmehr 2017; Shadmehr and Bernhardt 2015,
2017; Siegel 2009, 2013; Tyson and Smith 2018).
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ure 1 shows the sequence of moves and payoffs. The payoff θ from a successful revolution is
uncertain. The vanguard receives private signal s1 about θ and the citizen receives private
signal s2. The other expected payoffs are common knowledge, with hi > li. Thus, when only
one agent revolts, the revolution fails, and the sole revolter incurs a punishment cost.7 The
vanguard’s degree of radicalism is captured by z: a vanguard is more radical than the citizen
if z > 0, and it is more conservative if z < 0.8 The signals and θ are jointly distributed
with a strictly positive, continuously differentiable density f(s1, s2, θ) on R3. We assume
that s1, s2 and θ are strictly affiliated,
9 the expectation of the absolute value of θ is finite,
and we impose minimal structure on the tail properties of f(s1, s2, θ):
Assumption A1. For every k, for i, j = 1, 2, with j 6= i,
(a) lim
si→∞
E[θ|sj < k, si] =∞, lim
si→−∞
E[θ|sj > k, si] = −∞
(b) lim
si→∞
Pr(sj > k|si) = 1, lim
si→−∞
Pr(sj > k|si) = 0
(c) lim
s1→−∞
Pr(s2 > k|s1)E[θ|s2 > k, s1] > −∞.
A1 is mild. For example, it holds in an additive, normal noise signal setting where si = θ+νi,
i ∈ {1, 2}, and θ, ν1 and ν2 are independently distributed normal random variables. Parts (a)
and (b) are self explanatory. For example, limsi→∞E[θ|sj < k, si] = ∞ in part (a) ensures
that when a citizen’s signal is very good, he predicts that the state is also very good, even
given beliefs that the other citizen’s signal is below some fixed threshold k. Part (c) only
requires that the left hand side not be unboundedly negative.
Strategies. A pure strategy for the vanguard is a function ρ1 mapping its private signal s1
into an action choice, a1 ∈ {¬R,R}, where ¬R indicates no revolt and R indicates revolt. A
pure strategy for the citizen is a function ρ2 mapping his private signal s2 and the vanguard’s
action a1 into an action choice, a2 ∈ {¬R,R}. That is, ρ2 : R × {¬R,R} → {¬R,R}. The
7Because only the net expected payoffs of revolt or not enter action choices, if revolt has expected costs,
the payoffs in Figure 1 capture them via normalization of wi, hi, and li.
8For example, in the American Revolution, the gentry who led the Revolution were more conservative
than most citizens who participated in the Revolution. Summarizing the social composition of the American
Revolution, Middlekauff (2005, p. 622) writes: “An elite began the struggle against Britain in the 1760s,
and the people followed.” In the case of Virginia, for example, “the credit for the state’s remarkable
performance must be give to an elite, the gentry, an uncommon group which led the Virginia into the
Revolution and continued to lead afterward” (p. 625, see also Wilentz (2005, Ch. 1-2)).
9s1, s2 and θ are strictly affiliated if, for all y, y
′ ∈ R3, with y 6= y′, f(min{y, y′})f(max{y, y′}) >
f(y)f(y′), where min and max are defined component-wise (de Castro 2010; Milgrom & Weber 1982).
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equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
Equilibrium. When the vanguard does not revolt, the citizen has a dominant strategy to
do the same to avoid the punishment costs of h2− l2 > 0. Thus, our model delivers an essen-
tial feature of the Leninist notion of professional revolutionary vanguards that the vanguard
must lead for a revolution to succeed. Lemma A.1 in the Appendix shows that when the
vanguard revolts, the citizen’s best response takes a cutoff form in which he revolts whenever
his signal s2 exceeds a threshold k2 that depends on the vanguard’s strategy. Lemma A.2 in
the Appendix shows that if the citizen’s strategy takes a cutoff form, then so does the van-
guard’s. That is, the vanguard revolts whenever s1 ≥ k1 for some k1. These lemmas imply
that in any equilibrium in which the vanguard sometimes revolts, both agents adopt cutoff
strategies. Lemma 1 identifies the strategic forces that shape a citizen’s incentive to revolt.
Lemma 1. As the vanguard becomes more willing to revolt, the citizen revolts less. That is,
the citizen’s best response always features strategic substitutes: ∂k2(k1)
∂k1
< 0.
All proofs are in an appendix. A vanguard who is more willing to revolt does so after worse
signals about the revolution payoff—its cutoff k1 is lower. This lowers a citizen’s forecast of
the payoff from successful revolution—E[θ|s1 ≥ k1, s2] falls—reducing his incentive to revolt.
Unlike the citizen, the vanguard must decide whether to revolt without knowing whether
it will be joined; and if the vanguard is the sole challenger to the regime, it expects to be
punished. Thus, a vanguard faces a type of cost that the citizen does not—the miscoordi-
nation cost µ1 ≡ h1 − l1 > 0 that it pays when it revolts, but the citizen does not.10 With a
more compliant citizen (someone who is more likely to follow the vanguard), the vanguard is
less likely to incur the costs of miscoordination, and hence has more incentive to revolt. This
provides a force for strategic complements in the vanguard’s calculations. However, as a cit-
izen grows more compliant, he also follows the vanguard after receiving worse signals. This
reduces the vanguard’s expectation of the payoff from successful revolution—E[θ|s2 ≥ k2, s1]
falls—reducing its incentive to revolt. That is, excessive compliance by a citizen deprives the
10While the citizen faces miscoordination costs, he never incurs them because he sees the vanguard’s
action before deciding whether to revolt. Our results extend directly if the revolution can fail even when
both the vanguard and citizen revolt: this amounts to a renormalization of payoffs. Also, our results extend
qualitatively if there is a small probability p that a revolution succeeds even if only one party revolts. When
p is positive and the vanguard does not revolt, the citizen will revolt whenever his signal is so high that it
offsets the low probability of success and the negative news conveyed by the vanguard’s decision not to revolt.
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vanguard of effectively aggregating the citizen’s information—information that can protect
against a regime change that results in outcomes that are even worse than the status quo.
This constitutes a force for strategic substitutes in the vanguard’s calculations.
Lemma 2 shows that with a barely-compliant citizen who rarely follows the vanguard, the
force for strategic complements dominates: as a citizen becomes more likely to follow, the
vanguard revolts more. However, as the citizen grows more compliant, the force for strate-
gic substitutes rises relative to that for strategic complements. In fact, there is a unique
threshold on a citizen’s level of compliance after which the force for strategic substitutes
dominates: thereafter, as the citizen grows more compliant, the vanguard revolts less.
Lemma 2. There is a critical level k∗ of the citizen’s cutoff such that if k2 > k∗, a vanguard’s
best response features strategic complements; but if k2 < k
∗, it features strategic substitutes.
If a vanguard’s best response featured global strategic complements, equilibrium would
necessarily be unique—k1(k2) would be strictly increasing, and k2(k1) is strictly decreasing.
However, because a vanguard’s best response exhibits strategic substitutes when k2 is low,
multiple equilibria might exist. When w2 is sufficiently large, the crossing can only occur on
the strategic complement part of the vanguard’s best response, so equilibrium is unique. This
reflects that a higher w2 makes a citizen more reluctant to revolt, raising his best response—
for each k1, the best response cutoff k2(k1;w2) is higher. When w2 rises past a threshold,
the crossing occurs at k2 > k
∗, i.e., from a strategic perspective, the high risk of punishment
dominates the vanguard’s information aggregation concerns. To prove uniqueness more gen-
erally, we impose Assumption A2. Assumption A2 states that the conditional expectation
of θ is more sensitive to changes in a signal si = x than to changes in the cutoff x ≤ si:11
Assumption A2. For every x and y,
∂E[θ|s1 = x, s2 ≥ y]
∂x
∂E[θ|s1 ≥ x, s2 = y]
∂y
>
∂E[θ|s1 = x, s2 ≥ y]
∂y
∂E[θ|s1 ≥ x, s2 = y]
∂x
.
Lemma A.3 in the Appendix establishes that A2 holds with the classical additive, normal
noise signal structure. We maintain Assumptions A1 and A2 throughout the paper.
11This assumption regulates the slope of best responses, ensuring that the slope of the strategic substitutes
segment of the vanguard’s best response is more negative than the slope of the citizen’s best response. To
see the intuition, suppose l1 = h1, so that the vanguard’s best response features global strategic substitutes.
Then a change of variable transforms the game into a game of global strategic complements (Vives 2001, p.
34). Assumption A2 rules out multiple equilibria by limiting the degree of strategic complementarities.
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This leaves the possibility that, regardless of how promising its signal is, a vanguard never
revolts. Then, a citizen’s beliefs cannot be determined via Bayes rule on an off-equilibrium
path where the vanguard revolts. We impose a minimal plausibility condition on a citizen’s
off-equilibrium beliefs: if the vanguard revolts, then E[θ|a1 = R, s2] exceeds w2 for all suffi-
ciently high values of the citizen’s signal s2.
12 With this condition, an equilibrium in which
there is never revolution does not exist.
Proposition 1. There is a unique equilibrium. Equilibrium strategies take cutoff forms, and
revolution occurs with positive probability.
This result contrasts with what happens when there is no vanguard—i.e., when citizens
move simultaneously. Shadmehr and Bernhardt (2011) show that without a vanguard, there
is always an equilibrium in which citizens never revolt. Indeed, this no-revolt equilibrium is
the sole equilibrium if miscoordination costs hi − li are high. Without a vanguard, coordi-
nation breaks down because if each citizen believes that the other does not revolt, then s/he
does not revolt to avoid paying hi − li. By being the first to challenge a regime and risking
punishment, a vanguard helps coordination by ensuring that if the citizen revolts, he will
not be alone. One can extend this result to show that even in a simultaneous move setting,
asymmetric divisions of miscoordination costs facilitate coordination.13
2.1 State, Citizens, and Vanguard Radicalism
We now use our Leninist framework to study the sources of a vanguard’s ideological radical-
ism, and state actions that aim to curb the vanguard’s influence and contain the threat of
revolution. We begin with two critical, albeit simple, observations. A more radical vanguard
is more eager to revolt, which means that it sets a lower cutoff k1 for revolting. But, this
means that it revolts after receiving worse signals about successful revolution payoffs θ. In
turn, this reduces the citizen’s incentive to revolt by lowering his estimate of the successful
12If, following the vanguard’s decision to revolt, the citizen believes that the vanguard’s signal s1 cannot
be unboundedly negative, then Assumption A1(a) implies this minimal plausibility condition.
13This logic is distinct from coordination-enhancing channels in which vanguards send public signals
that reduce strategic risks and convey information about anti-regime sentiments (Bueno de Mesquita 2010;
Lohmann 1994). See Morris (2014) for the link between timing frictions and equilibrium uniqueness.
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revolution payoffs, E[θ|s1 ≥ k1, s2].14
Proposition 2. The more radical is the revolutionary vanguard, the more likely it is to
revolt, and the less likely is the citizen to provide support:
∂k1(z)
∂z
< 0 <
∂k2(z)
∂z
,
where k1(z) and k2(z) are the endogenous equilibrium cutoffs.
That the action of more radical vanguards contains less positive information about the
revolution payoff reflects the more general idea that conflict of interest hinders signaling, and
appears in many related settings, including Loeper et al. (2014) or Angeletos et al. (2007,
as Little (2017) observes).
State and Vanguard Radicalism. Proposition 2 highlights key tradeoffs for a regime that
aims to prevent regime change. One might think that greater rewards to a citizen for defying
a revolutionary vanguard, and harsher punishments for failed revolt are always complemen-
tary tools for the state, and that increasing either always has value to the regime. Indeed,
if a regime can punish failed revolters extremely harshly at minimal expense, or radically
raise the reward w2 to a citizen for defying a vanguard, or “deradicalize” a vanguard by
decreasing z sufficiently, then it can reduce the probability of successful revolt almost to
zero. However, when such actions are not possible, it can be optimal for the state to go
in the opposite direction. The state does not care about the probability of revolt, per se,
but rather about the probability that a revolt succeeds, and successful revolt requires that
both the vanguard and citizen act. As a result, to reduce the probability of successful revolt,
rather than anoint a modestly conservative citizen as a puppet vanguard of the opposition
(e.g., a union vanguard), the regime may do better to radicalize the vanguard. A vanguard
with a larger z is more eager to revolt, delegitimizing the vanguard in the eyes of citizens.
Increasing z has conflicting effects: the direct, non-strategic effect is to increase the
vanguard’s incentive to revolt; but the indirect, strategic effect is to decrease the citizen’s
14One can show that even if z = 0, the vanguard may appear to be more radical than the citizen, setting
a lower cutoff for revolt. That is, even though the vanguard alone risks punishment by the regime, it may
still be more willing than a citizen to act given the same signal about revolution payoffs. This is because
the vanguard must also weigh the possible gains of acting in order to let the citizen’s information determine
whether the revolution succeeds. The vanguard is more willing to act than the citizen whenever the citizen’s
payoff from not supporting the vanguard is high (so that the citizen is not too willing to act), but not too
high (so that the vanguard does not face an excessively high risk of miscoordination, and hence punishment).
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incentive to follow the vanguard. This strategic effect further feeds back into the revolu-
tionary vanguard’s strategic considerations, which can mitigate (amplify) the direct effect
when the vanguard’s best response features strategic complements (substitutes). When the
strategic effect dominates, the likelihood of successful revolution falls as the vanguard be-
come more radical—see Figure 2. Let P be the probability of successful revolution, i.e.,
P = Pr(s1 ≥ k1, s2 ≥ k2). Then,
dP
dz
=
(
∂P
∂k1
+
∂P
∂k2
∂k2
∂k1
)
dk1
dz
.
The first term in the parenthesis captures the direct, non-strategic effect of having a more
radical vanguard, and is positive. The second term captures the strategic effect of having a
more radical vanguard and is negative: ∂k2
∂k1
< 0, reflecting that the follower’s best response
always features strategic substitutes. As Figure 2 illustrates in an additive normal noise
setting, P (z) is single-peaked in z, and the state wants to avoid that maximum. When the
vanguard is sufficiently conservative, the non-strategic effect dominates. From that point, as
the vanguard’s level of radicalism begins to rise, so does the probability of successful revolt.
However, once the vanguard’s level of radicalism z rises far enough, a threshold is reached af-
ter which the strategic effect dominates and the likelihood of successful revolution falls as the
vanguard becomes ever more radical. In sum, the state would like a sufficiently conservative
vanguard that is unlikely to revolt; failing that, the state would like a sufficiently extreme
vanguard that is unlikely to win the following required for a revolution to succeed. The
same logic underlies why a state may be better off refraining from punishing the leaders of
a failed revolt to reduce their following. These results provide a theoretical lens to interpret
seemingly paradoxical interactions of some authoritarian regimes with their opponents, e.g.,
Assad’s double game of supporting al-Qaeda, and the Shah’s mild punishment of Khomeini.
As Figure 2 shows, when a citizen’s disloyalty payoff w2 is high, the probability of a suc-
cessful revolution may be highest with a slightly conservative vanguard, whose payoff from
successful revolt is less than the citizen’s. Figure 3 numerically illustrates how with normally
distributed uncertainty, when the state raises the citizen’s disloyalty payoff w2, the level of
the vanguard’s radicalism that maximizes the likelihood of successful revolution falls. Para-
doxically, the vanguard’s increased willingness to revolt can make the citizen sufficiently less
willing to follow that it reduces the likelihood that the regime is overthrown. Thus, a regime
13
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Figure 2: Probability of successful revolution as a function of the revolutionary vanguard’s
radicalism z. si = θ + i, with θ, i ∼ iidN(0, 1), h1 = 0.1, l1 = 0, w2 = 1.2.
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Figure 3: The revolutionary vanguard’s level of radicalism z∗(w2) that maximizes the
probability of successful revolution as a function of the citizen’s disloyalty rewards w2.
si = θ + i, with θ, i ∼ iidN(0, 1), h1 = 0.1, l1 = 0.
must be wary about combining the twin tools of more generously rewarding a citizen who
turns on the vanguard, and of also punishing the vanguard after a failed revolt somewhat
more harshly. Doing so can backfire and increase the probability of successful revolt.
Citizen Preferences for Vanguard Radicalism. The preceding analysis suggests that
one source of vanguard radicalism can be a state that tries to promote radical vanguards
in order to reduce their appeal to citizens. But citizens also care. In early stages of the
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formation of vanguard organizations, decisions by citizens of which potential vanguards to
support can effectively determine the radicalism of the future established vanguards that
will decide whether and when to initiate revolt. Proposition 3 characterizes how the repre-
sentative citizen’s preferred level of radicalism in a vanguard hinge on the various payoffs to
agents from successful and unsuccessful revolution:
Proposition 3. Fixing the other parameters, there exists a h¯ < w2 such that if h2 > h¯ then
the citizen’s preferred level of radicalism in a vanguard is given by
z∗ =
Pr(s2 < k2|s1 = k1) (w2 − l1)− (h2 − h1)
Pr(s2 ≥ k2|s1 = k1) , (1)
where k1 and k2 are the endogenous equilibrium cutoffs. If, instead h2 < h¯ then the citizen
always wants the vanguard to revolt, i.e., z∗ = ∞. That is, the citizen’s preferred level of
vanguard radicalism features a threshold effect.
The proposition shows that small changes in the citizen’s status quo payoff can dramat-
ically change the citizen’s preferred vanguard. As long as the citizen’s status quo payoff h2
is not too low, he prefers a vanguard that only revolts whenever its signal indicates that
revolution payoffs are high, i.e., z∗ is finite. When a vanguard revolts selectively, its action
reveals information about the value of successful revolution, but sometimes it prevents rev-
olution when the citizen wants the revolution to succeed. However, once a citizen’s status
quo payoff falls below a critical threshold, he suddenly switches to preferring an extremely
radical vanguard that always revolts, i.e., z∗ = ∞. The intuition for the result is that the
value of such information is bounded, and when the citizen’s status quo is sufficiently bad,
having the option to change the regime dominates the value of the vanguard’s information.
This threshold effect sheds light on abrupt surges of support for vanguards with extreme
interests in revolution. For example, in the late Pahlavi Regime, many politically-active
Iranians supported the Liberation Movement of Iran (LMI) and the Nationalists who or-
ganized protests, but were far less eager than Khomeini’s faction to mount a revolution.
However, in the years just preceding the Iranian Revolution, support for Khomeini grew so
rapidly that even Bazargan, a founding member of the LMI, was marginalized for being too
conservative in advocating revolution (Chehabi 1990; Katouzian 1981; Mottahedeh 1985).
Our model suggests that the Shah’s increased authoritarian approach following the oil boom
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of the mid-1970s15 together with the subsequent economic crisis reduced status quo payoffs
below the threshold that justified following a “cautious vanguard” that would initiate revolt
selectively, causing many Iranians to switch support to Khomeini.
To understand how a citizen’s preferred level of radicalism in a vanguard varies with
other characteristics, recognize that choosing z amounts to choosing the equilibrium level of
the vanguard’s cutoff k1. From the citizen’s perspective, the optimal cutoff k1 only depends
on his payoffs w2 and h2. However, the vanguard’s payoffs h1 and l1 influence its willingness
to revolt, and hence the level of radicalism that the citizen seeks in a vanguard. When the
punishment for failed revolt rises, i.e., when l1 is lower, the vanguard is more reluctant to
revolt. To reduce k1 back to the citizen’s preferred level, the citizen wants to increase z,
i.e., z∗ is decreasing in l1.16 The effect of raising the citizen’s disloyalty payoff w2 is more
complicated because the direct effect of raising w2 is to induce the citizen to revolt less, i.e.,
to increase k2; and the impact of raising k2 on k1 depends on whether the vanguard’s best
response exhibits strategic complements (k1 rises) or strategic substitutes (k1 falls).
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Vanguard Radicalism and Coercion. A vanguard cannot typically choose its followers.
However, in settings such as civil wars or guerrilla movements, a vanguard can punish those
who do not follow its lead. For example, guerrillas contemplating an attack on a government
military post near a village can subsequently punish the villagers if they do not cooper-
ate (Kalyvas 2006; Wood 2003) by setting houses on fire or kidnapping them. Ahlquist
and Levi (2011) highlight in their review of the leadership literature that vanguards can
often use coercion to make others follow their lead, and yet “no model so far encapsulates
noninformational tools available to leaders, such as coercion” (p. 14).
The vanguard’s use of coercion amounts to reducing the citizen’s payoff from w2 to w2−c
when the vanguard revolts, but the citizen does not. How much coercion c should a van-
guard employ? We show that a vanguard does better to allow for some “dissent” in order to
make more effective use of a citizen’s information. If the vanguard punishes a citizen severely
whenever he does not provide support, the citizen revolts even when his information suggests
15In 1974, the secretary general of Amnesty International stated that “no country in the world has a
worse record in human rights than Iran” (Bill 1988, p. 187).
16Similarly, one can show that z∗ increases in h1.
17Formally, one can show the following result. Suppose h2 = h1, w2 > l1, and the vanguard’s best
response features strategic substitutes. Then, z∗ is increasing in w2.
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that the outcome of successful revolution would be far worse than the status quo. This hurts
the vanguard. Given this logic, one may conjecture that as the precision of a vanguard’s
information rises and it grows more confident in its information, the vanguard feels less need
to rely on the citizen’s information, and hence finds harsher coercive measures optimal. This
reasoning is wrong: the citizen already accounts for the quality of a vanguard’s information in
his strategic calculations. As a result, the vanguard’s optimal choice of coercion is unrelated
to the quality of the citizen’s and vanguard’s information:
Proposition 4. If, prior to observing s1, a vanguard can choose how much to punish the
citizen when he does not provide support, then it chooses c = max{w2 − l1 + z, 0}.
In most settings, the vanguard is more radical than the citizen and suffers more follow-
ing a failed revolt. In such circumstances, c = w2 − l1 + z > 0,18 and the vanguard uses
more coercion when it is more radical, or when it risks a harsher punishment for initiating
a failed revolt. To see the intuition, recall that the citizen joins the vanguard whenever
E[θ|s1 ≥ k1, s2] ≥ w2. By having the citizen internalize its payoff when the citizen does not
support the revolution, the vanguard induces the citizen to make the decision that is optimal
from the vanguard’s perspective based solely on the citizen’s information.
The result that a vanguard wants to exactly align the citizen’s preferences with its own
contrasts with what a citizen wants in the vanguard. Most obviously, once the citizen’s status
quo payoffs are low enough, the citizen wants an extremely radical vanguard that always re-
volts. This allows the citizen to avoid low status quo payoffs and to choose between the disloy-
alty and revolution payoffs, albeit at the cost of learning less about those revolution payoffs.
Paradoxically, the vanguard’s use of coercion can benefit the citizen by raising the van-
guard’s confidence that the citizen will support it, making the vanguard more willing to initi-
ate revolution. To highlight most transparently that a citizen can gain from coercion, suppose
that h2 = h1 = h and z = 0 so that with optimal coercion, the vanguard and citizen’s payoffs
are the same. Then, when E[θ] >> h and w2 is sufficiently large, not only the vanguard, but
also the citizen, benefit from the vanguard’s coercion. When w2 is very large, absent coer-
cion, the vanguard almost never revolts, so the citizen and vanguard almost always receive
18If w2 + z < l1, a vanguard would like to compensate the citizen—if it could. This situation may arise
in a civil war in which the government uses violence indiscriminately in a region with guerrilla activities.
However, in such scenarios, guerrillas likely cannot protect citizens who do not cooperate.
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h, and the citizen’s expected payoff is only marginally above h. With coercion, the vanguard
revolts whenever its signal is high enough that it expects to gain over the status quo, and
since the citizen’s payoff with coercion equals the vanguard’s, the citizen must also benefit.
The result that the quality of the vanguard’s information does not influence its use of
coercion hinges on the assumption that the vanguard and citizen share common beliefs about
the quality of each others’ signals. If, instead, the vanguard has more faith in its information
than does the citizen, i.e., if the vanguard thinks that the citizen believes that the vanguard’s
information is less precise than the vanguard believes its own information to be, then the
vanguard wants to use more coercion to adjust for the citizen’s lesser incentive to revolt.19
Proposition 5. Suppose w2−l1+z > 0, E[θ|s1 ≥ k1, s2] is strictly decreasing in the variance
of θ|s1, and it is common knowledge that the vanguard and citizen disagree about the quality
of the vanguard’s signal: the vanguard believes that var(θ|s1) = v1, and the citizen believes
that var(θ|s1) = v2. Then, the vanguard’s choice of coercion, c(v1, v2), increases in v2 − v1,
with c(v, v) = w2 − l1 + z.
When the citizen believes that the vanguard’s information is less precise, then from the
vanguard’s perspective, the citizen underweights the positive information about the revolu-
tion payoffs conveyed by the vanguard’s decision to revolt. To correct for this, the vanguard
reduces the citizen’s payoff when he fails to support the vanguard. Many vanguards have
strong ideological convictions that cause them to be overconfident in their knowledge, others
live underground with limited contacts where “correlation neglect” (Della Porta 2013; Levy
and Razin 2015) may cause them to put excessive weight on confirmations received from
like-minded comrades. Proposition 5 shows that when these disparities are more severe, a
vanguard uses harsher coercion to elicit the desired behavior from citizens.
3 An Early-Riser Model of Vanguards
The preceding analysis developed a Leninist model of vanguards. We now develop an early-
riser model of vanguards, in which it is not the heterogeneous attributes of a group of citizens
19In Proposition 5, the assumption that E[θ|s1 ≥ k1, s2] is strictly decreasing in the variance of θ|s1 is
satisfied by the additive normal noise signal structure—see equation (9) in the Appendix.
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(e.g., their skills and experience) that determines who initiates a protest, but rather their
information. In contrast to the Leninist notion where the leaders of revolution are estab-
lished professional revolutionaries, in the early-rise notion of vanguards, potential leaders
of a revolution emerge organically based on their assessments of the risks and rewards of
revolution. We analyze this endogenous emergence of vanguards and show how revolution
outcomes differ in Leninist and early-riser models of vanguards.
To highlight the contrast between the early-riser and Leninist notions of vanguards, we
now suppose that no group has a “technological advantage” over the other in initiating re-
volt. Thus, in our two-period model, two ex-ante identical citizens receive private signals
about the payoffs from successful revolution. Both citizens can act at each date. At date
1, citizens simultaneously decide whether to revolt. If both revolt, the revolution succeeds,
and each citizen receives θ. Otherwise, citizens see each other’s date 1 actions, and those
who did not revolt at date 1 have a second chance to act at date 2. The revolution succeeds
whenever both citizens revolt by the end of date 2, when payoffs are realized. We maintain
the payoff structure that (a) the status quo payoff is h; (b) if one citizen revolts, but the
other does not, the sole revolter receives l < h, and the other citizen receives w; and (c) if
both revolt, the revolution succeeds, and each citizen receives θ. We impose symmetry on
the signal structure: f(s1, s2, θ) = f(s2, s1, θ) for all s1, s2, and θ.
When a citizen acts at date 2, he can base his decision on the information revealed by the
other citizen’s date-one choice of whether or not to act. But by initiating revolt at date 1, a
citizen can endogenously assume the mantle of a leader, revealing to the other citizen that he
has information indicating that revolution is worthwhile. Thus, citizens have incentives both
to lead at date 1, in order to signal good news about revolution payoffs and deliver a success-
ful revolution; and to defer at date 1, in order to free ride on the information conveyed by the
other citizen’s actions, thereby reducing the risk of being punished for leading a failed revolt.
We focus on symmetric equilibria in which citizens set cutoff α for revolt at date 1; cutoff
β for revolt at date 2 if the other citizen revolted at date 1; and cutoff γ at date 2 if no one
revolted at date 1. To ease presentation, we also assume w ≥ h.
Proposition 6. A symmetric equilibrium with finite cutoffs α and β always exists. In equi-
librium, α > β: a citizen is strictly more willing to revolt when the other citizen takes on
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the mantle of leadership. Further, when γ is finite (i.e., when a failure of a leader to emerge
does not preclude revolution), then β < γ < α.
To understand the tradeoffs, first suppose that if no one revolts at date 1, then no one
revolts at date 2. The benefit of revolt at date 1 is to induce the other citizen to support
the revolution (at date 2) when he has signal s ∈ [β, α). The cost of revolt at date 1 is that
it risks punishment when the other citizen’s signal is below β. Conversely, deferring revolt
forgoes successful revolution outcomes when the other citizen has signal s ∈ [β, α), but does
not risk punishment for leading a failed revolt when the other citizen has signal s < β. In
equilibrium, a citizen with threshold signal α must be indifferent between initiating revolt
to signal his information and deferring to free-ride. This means that
Pr(β ≤ s2 < α|s1 = α) (E[θ|s1 = α, β ≤ s2 < α]− h) = Pr(s2 < β|s1 = α) (h− l).
Equilibria in which revolt is initiated at date 2 can only exist under extreme parametric
conditions.20 To see this, consider the tradeoffs in any hypothetical equilibrium in which
revolt is sometimes initiated at date 2: if no one revolts at date 1, then a citizen revolts
at date 2 when his signal exceeds γ < α. Consider citizen 1 with signal s1 = α at date 1.
If citizen 2 revolts, then revolting and not revolting at date 1 does not make a difference
because citizen 1 will revolt at date 2 as s1 = α > β. However, if citizen 2 does not revolt,
then citizen 1 faces a tradeoff. Revolting (versus not revolting) induces citizen 2 to revolt for
signals s2 ∈ [β, γ), but risks extra punishment when s2 ∈ [β, γ).21 Equilibrium requires that
Pr(s2 ∈ [β, γ)|α)(E[θ|s1 = α, s2 ∈ [β, γ)]− h) = Pr(s2 ∈ [β, γ)|α)(l − h). (2)
The left hand side is the incremental gain from revolting (vs. not revolting) for the marginal
citizen with signal α, and the right hand is the corresponding incremental cost. The
proof of Proposition 6 reveals that necessary (demanding) conditions for the existence of an
equilibrium cutoff γ < α are:
E[θ|s1 = α, s2 ∈ [β, γ)] = l, and E[θ|s1 = γ, s2 ∈ [γ, α)] > E[θ|s1 ≥ α, s2 = β] = w.
20Indeed, we have not been able to find such equilibria; our characterization is a necessary description if
such equilibria exist.
21If citizen 1 (with signal s1 = α) revolts at date one, he is punished when s2 < β; and if
he does not revolt, then he will revolt at date 2 (because γ < s1 = α) and is punished when
s2 < γ. Thus, the change in the expected punishment from revolting versus not revolting is
[Pr(s2 < β|s1 = α)− Pr(s2 < γ|s1 = α)] (h− l) = Pr(β ≤ s2 < γ|s1 = α) (l − h).
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The first equality is the indifference condition for cutoff α—equation (2) above. The last
equality is the indifference condition for β. The inequality is implied by the indifference
condition for γ—see equation (23) in the Appendix—which also implies that γ > β.
Having analyzed existence of equilibrium and the tradeoffs inherent in the equilibrium for
both Leninist and early-riser models of vanguards, we compare the extent of revolt in these
models. To make the models comparable, we consider the Leninist model of a vanguard with
symmetric payoffs and symmetric signal structures.
Proposition 7. An established vanguard is more likely to initiate revolt than is an organic
vanguard, but its revolt is less likely to be followed: β < k2 < k1 < α. That is, in the Leninist
model of vanguards, a revolution is more likely to be initiated than in the early-riser model
of vanguards; but revolutions that begin organically are more likely to succeed.
This proposition holds regardless of whether or not citizens initiate revolution at date 2.
To see the intuition, note that “waiting” is very costly for an established vanguard: if the
vanguard does not act, then revolution will not happen. When, instead, vanguards emerge
organically, the opportunity cost of “not revolting” is lower because when one citizen does
not revolt at date 1, a revolution can still happen: the other citizen may have initiated revolt
(when its signal is high enough), which would then allow the first citizen to follow. As a
result, with an endogenous, early-riser notion of a vanguard, a citizen is more reluctant to
initiate revolt than a Leninist established vanguard would be. In turn, because citizens set a
higher cutoff for initiating revolt when vanguards emerge organically, more good news is re-
vealed when one of them revolts, causing citizens to set a lower cutoff for supporting a revolt.
Proposition 7 says that an established vanguard is more likely to revolt than an organic
one. This result is driven by incentives to free-ride on the other citizen, to avoid the risk
of being punished. One might conjecture that these free-riding incentives must reduce the
probability of successful revolution below its level with an established vanguard, impairing
citizen welfare. This reasoning is flawed—a Leninist established vanguard-follower structure
does not even necessarily make revolution more likely. In particular, when the leadership
mantle is endogenous, either citizen can lead a revolution, whereas in the Leninist model,
no matter how promising the follower believes revolution payoffs to be, the vanguard must
act first for a revolution to succeed. Moreover, conditional on a revolution being initiated,
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Figure 4: Probability of regime change. Left: The solid (dashed) curve is the probability
of regime change in the early-riser (Leninist) model of vanguards. Right: The solid curve
minus the dashed curve. Parameters: σ2 = 1, σ2ν = 0.85, l = −2, and h ∈ [−1.95, 1.95].
a revolution is more likely to succeed when leaders emerge endogenously, as an endogenous
follower is always more willing to revolt.
This leads us to numerically investigate the probability of successful revolution in the two
models in settings with an additive, normal noise signal structure when w = h. As Figure 4
illustrates, this analysis suggests that when (a) the expected status quo payoff is better than
the ex-ante expected revolution payoff, and (b) the punishment from leading a failed revolt
is not too small (h > E[θ] = 0 and h >> l), then the probability of successful revolution is
higher in the early-riser model (where either citizen’s information can induce him to lead)
than in the Leninist model of established vanguard. More generally, when leading a failed
revolution has sufficient costs, revolution is most likely to succeed with organic leaders.
However, this ordering on the likelihood of successful revolution is reversed when (a)
leading a failed revolt has modest costs (µ = h − l is small), and (b) the status quo is bad
(h < 0) so that the likelihood of revolution is high. In such settings, the likelihood of suc-
cessful revolution can be higher in the Leninist model of established professional vanguard.
The intuition is that when the punishment µ for leading a failed revolt is small, the fact
that the established vanguard is less likely to be followed than an endogenous leader matters
less. With one opportunity to act, a vanguard must revolt to let its follower’s information
be pivotal in determining outcomes. When the punishment for failed revolt is small, the
value of revolting to allow the other citizen’s information determine what happens swamps
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the cost (in terms of µ and possible ex post regret). This incentive to revolt when µ is small
exists with an established vanguard, but it is absent in the endogenous setting. Qualita-
tively, however, once the punishment µ for leading a failed revolt takes on more than modest
values, or the status quo is “good enough,” this incentive is swamped, and the probability
of successful revolution is higher in the early-riser endogenous model of vanguard.
Welfare. We now show that when w = h, so that the payoff of a citizen who does not revolt
is unaffected by the other citizen’s action, citizens are too reluctant to revolt from a welfare
perspective. As the logic is identical, we prove the result in the endogenous vanguard setting.
We establish in the early riser model where revolution is not initiated at date 2 that
from a given citizen’s perspective, the other citizen does not revolt enough, i.e., his cutoffs
α and β for revolution are too high. First, consider the choice of β: suppose that citizen
1 has revolted, and citizen 2 must decide whether to follow. Citizen 2 compares the payoff
w received when he does not revolt, with his expected payoff from revolt. However, citi-
zen 1 would have citizen 2 weigh the payoff l that citizen 1 receives when citizen 2 does
not revolt against the expected payoff from revolt. Because l < w, citizen 1 would prefer
citizen 2 lower his cutoff below β. Now, consider the choice of α. Citizen 1’s payoffs are
only affected by a marginal reduction in α set by citizen 2 when citizen 1 receives a signal
s1 ∈ [β, α): with the reduction, citizen 1 would receive E[θ|s2 ≈ α, β ≤ s1 < α] rather
than h. However, citizen 2’s indifference condition for initiating revolt given signal α implies
E[θ|s2 = α, β ≤ s1 < α]−h > 0 because citizen 2 worries that s1 < β, and he gets punished.
It follows that citizens are too reluctant from a social welfare perspective to initiate revolt.
In particular, the socially optimal symmetric cutoffs αs and βs solve:
Pr(βs ≤ s2 < αs|s1 = αs) (E[θ|s1 = αs, βs ≤ s2 < αs]− h) = Pr(s2 < βs|s1 = αs) h− l
2
,
and E[θ|s1 ≥ αs, s2 = βs] = h+ l
2
.
In contrast, equilibrium indifference conditions demand that the term h−l
2
be (h− l) and the
term h+l
2
be h. Thus, citizens would gain from an ex-ante perspective if they could commit
to reducing their cutoffs below equilibrium levels.
Variations in primitives can have perverse welfare effects due to the impact on information
aggregation from equilibrium actions. Consider the effects of harshening the consequences
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for leading a failed revolution. Obviously, the direct effect of reducing l is to reduce citizen
welfare. Moreover, the first-order indirect strategic effect reduces welfare further: reducing l
makes citizens more reluctant to initiate revolt, i.e., they raise α. But, the second-order indi-
rect strategic effect raises citizen welfare: increases in α cause citizens who see that a revolt
was initiated to update more positively about revolution payoffs, causing them to reduce the
cutoff β for providing support. A numerical investigation shows that the welfare-increasing
effect of the reduction in β can sometimes dominate, so that as l falls, welfare can rise. Sim-
ilar conflicting welfare forces can arise in the Leninist model with an established vanguard.
Our analysis is silent about when one should expect to observe a Leninist or early-riser
vanguard. However, one can speculate about which environments may be more conducive to
one form or the other. For example, if a regime’s internal security apparatus is strong and
undivided, early-risers may be captured before their actions are observed by others, while
organized professional revolutionaries may have the skills to avoid an early capture and to
propagate their actions more effectively. This is Lenin’s argument in What Is to be Done?.
Disparaging “slavish cringing to spontaneity” and “amateurish methods” by “worshippers
of the spontaneous movement,” Lenin argues that only an organization of professional rev-
olutionaries can avert the repression of the Tsarist regime effectively enough to maintain a
revolutionary movement. Lenin highlights a pattern in spontaneous revolutionary actions:
unskilled agitators try to organize a movement, and sometimes even make some initial suc-
cesses; but before the movement catches on, police capture the leaders, and the unrest fizzles.
These leaders fail withstand police tactics due to their “lack of practical training, of ability
to carry on organizational work.” “The struggle against the political police requires spe-
cial qualities; it requires professional revolutionaries” (p. 69) “without which the proletariat
cannot wage a stubborn struggle against its excellently trained enemies” (p. 84).
Taking strike as an example of anti-regime action, Lenin laments that strikes “remain
‘secret’ to the masses of Russian workers because the government takes care to cut all commu-
nication with the strikers, to prevent all news of strikes from spreading” (p. 70). The remedy,
Lenin forcefully argues, is in a centralized and secretive organization of relatively few selective
professional revolutionaries “who make revolutionary activity their profession” (p. 71).
“Only an incorrigible utopian would have a broad organization of workers, with elec-
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tions, reports, universal suffrage, etc., under the autocracy” (p. 76). Such an organization
may be more accessible to the masses, but it is “most accessible to the police” (p. 76).
In contrast, Lenin’s vanguards who are “trained professionally no less than the police, will
centralize all the secret aspects of the work—the drawing up of leaflets, the working out
of approximate plans, etc.” (p. 80). When the movement has “forces of specially trained
worker-revolutionaries who have gone through extensive preparation (and, of course, revo-
lutionaries ‘of all arms of the service’), no political police in the world will then be able to
contend with them” (p. 84-5). Thus, “in an autocratic state,” Lenin argues, “the more we
confine the membership of such an organization to people who are professionally engaged in
revolutionary activity and who have been professionally trained in the art of combating the
political police, the more difficult will it be to unearth the organization” (p. 79).
Lenin’s argument emphasizes the creation of a vanguard organization in Tsarist Russia.
However, he recognizes that under less repressive regimes, such as Germany in the early
1900s, the need for centralized and secretive professional revolutionaries may be less severe
as there is some room for sustained agitation without the fear of immediate reprisal. In such
an environment, many could lead a successful revolution—a setting that recalls the origins of
the 2011 Tunisian Revolution. Beyond Lenin’s arguments, in other contexts, the role of van-
guards is played by groups that, due to their status, have more protection against repression
and access to social networks and funds. For example, both in the Iranian Constitutional
Revolution of the early 20th century and in over a three decades preceding the 1979 Iranian
Revolution, the Shia clergy enjoyed some level of protection from repression and had access
to a vast religious network and funds (Abrahamian 1982). Similarly during the American
Revolution, the gentry who occupied critical positions in the colonial legislatures and owned
significant wealth were positioned to lead the revolution, while being somewhat protected
from repression and able to finance the movement (Middlekauff 2005).
4 Conclusion and Discussion
Revolutionary vanguards, their radicalism and coercive actions, and their interactions with
citizens and the state are common threads in narratives of revolutionary movements. But
what are the defining features of revolutionary vanguards? We identify two main notions of
25
vanguards and develop frameworks that capture their essence and explore their implications:
• Conceptualization: A key differentiating feature in various conceptions of vanguards
is whether a vanguard is distinguished from other citizens by its protest expertise, or
its skills in initiating anti-regime activities. This is Lenin’s idea of vanguards, which
closely resembles the notion of revolutionary entrepreneurs in the literature. In con-
trast, in the alternative “early riser” notion of vanguards, the vanguard is not comprised
of skilled revolutionaries; rather, the vanguard emerges organically in the protest pro-
cess. That is, the vanguard is comprised of those citizens who have the most optimistic
assessments of the risks and rewards of protest, and hence are the first to act.
• Implications of Different Vanguard Notions: We identify the differences in the
outcomes of revolution that arise from these two vanguard notions. With the Leninist
notion of a vanguard, a revolution is more likely to be initiated but less likely to win
support from citizens than with the early-riser notion of a vanguard. That is, revolu-
tions that begin organically are more likely to succeed. A numerical analysis suggests
that when the vanguard emerges organically, the likelihood of successful revolution is
higher unless the punishment for failed revolt is small.
We show how these frameworks can be used to study: (a) state strategies in mitigat-
ing a vanguard’s influence on citizens; (b) the sources of a vanguard radicalism; and (c) a
vanguards’ use of coercion against citizens.
• State Strategies and Vanguard Radicalism. A more radical vanguard revolts
more, but is less likely to generate a following. Paradoxically, a state that aims to
prevent regime change may prefer radical to moderate vanguards (e.g., Assad’s double-
game with ISIS), or set mild punishments for leaders of a failed revolt (e.g., the Shah’s
punishment of Khomeini in the 1960s and 1970s).
• Preferences over Vanguard Radicalism. If the status quo deteriorates too low,
moderate citizens prefer very radical vanguards who always revolt even though this
blocks the flow of information from vanguards to citizens about the merits of a post-
revolution regime. This result can reconcile the abrupt surges in support for radical
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vanguards that sometimes occur (e.g., in the years just before the Iranian Revolution
when Khomeini’s support rose sharply at the expense of more moderate opposition).
• Vanguard’s Use of Coercion. In contrast, a vanguard never wants to block all infor-
mation flow from citizens via their equilibrium actions. That is, a vanguard’s desire to
use citizens’ information about the merits of revolution—to protect against truly bad
outcomes—always moderates its use of punishment against citizens who do not coop-
erate. Still, if a vanguard is more radical or if it has more confidence in its knowledge
than do citizens then it employs harsher coercion. This result can explain why ideolog-
ical vanguards (e.g., Bolsheviks) or clandestine revolutionary organizations who tend
to be overconfident about their knowledge also tend to use more coercive measures.
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5 Appendix
Lemma A.1. Suppose the vanguard sometimes revolts, i.e., that ρ1(s1) = R for some s1.
Then the citizen’s best response to ρ1(·) takes a cutoff form: There exists a finite cutoff k2(ρ1)
such that the citizen revolts if and only if s2 ≥ k2(ρ1).
Proof of Lemma A.1: The citizen’s best response following a1 and s2 is to take action R
if and only if E[θ|ρ1(s1) = R, s2] ≥ w2. The limit properties in Part (a) of A1 imply the
existence of sufficiently good and bad signals, so that there exists a signal s2 = k2 such that
E[θ|ρ1(s1) = R, k2] = w2. Strict affiliation of signals implies that E[θ|ρ1(s1) = R, s2] > w2,
∀s2 > k2, and E[θ|ρ1(s1) = R, s2] < w2, ∀s2 < k2. 
Lemma A.2. Suppose that ρ2(s2, R) = R if and only if s2 ≥ k2. Then, given Assumption
A1, there exists a k1 such that the vanguard’s best response is to revolt if and only if s1 ≥ k1.
Proof of Lemma A.2: Given the citizen’s cutoff k2, the vanguard’s expected net payoff
from revolt is ∆(s1; k2) ≡ Pr(s2 ≥ k2|s1) (E[θ|s2 ≥ k2, s1]+z)+Pr(s2 < k2|s1)l1−h1, which
simplifies to
∆(s1; k2) = Pr(s2 ≥ k2|s1) (E[θ|s2 ≥ k2, s1] + z − l1) + l1 − h1. (3)
From parts (a) and (b) of A1, lims1→−∞∆(s1; k2) < 0 < lims1→+∞∆(s1; k2). Moreover, both
Pr(s2 ≥ k2|s1) and E[θ|s2 ≥ k2, s1] rise with s1 due to affiliation. Thus, from equation (3),
if ∆(s1 = x; k2) = 0, then ∆(s1; k2) > 0, ∀s1 > x. Thus, for every k2, there exists a unique
s1 = k1 such that ∆(k1; k2) = 0, with ∆(s1; k2) > 0, ∀s1 > k1, and ∆(s1; k2) < 0, ∀s1 < k1.
Further,
∂∆(s1; k2)
∂s1
∣∣∣
s1=k1
> 0.  (4)
Proof of Lemma 1: Let k2(k1) be the citizen’s best response to the vanguard’s strategy
with associated cutoff k1. From Lemma A.1, E[θ|s1 ≥ k1, s2 = k2]− w2 = 0. Thus,
∂k2(k1)
∂k1
= −
(
∂E[θ|s1 ≥ k1, s2]
∂s2
∣∣∣∣
s2=k2
)−1
∂E[θ|s1 ≥ k1, s2 = k2]
∂k1
.
By affiliation, both terms are positive, and hence ∂k2(k1)
∂k1
< 0. 
Proof of Lemma 2: Let k1(k2) be the vanguard’s best response cutoff to the citizen’s cutoff
strategy with the associated cutoff k2. To ease exposition, sometimes we drop the argument
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of k1(k2) and write k1. By the Implicit Function Theorem,
∂k1(k2)
∂k2
= −
(
∂∆(s1; k2)
∂s1
∣∣∣∣∣
s1=k1
)−1
∂∆(s1 = k1; k2)
∂k2
, (5)
where (4) in Lemma A.2 ensures that ∂∆(s1;k2)
∂s1
∣∣∣
s1=k1
> 0. Rewrite equation (3) as
∆(s1; k2) =
∫ ∞
k2
(E[θ|s2, s1] + z) g(s2|s1) ds2 +G(k2|s1) l1 − h1,
where g(·|s1) is the PDF of s2 conditional on s1, and G(·|s1) is the corresponding CDF. Let
δ(x, y) ≡ E[θ|s2 = x, s1 = y] + z − l1. Thus,
∂∆(k1; k2)
∂k2
= g(k2|s1 = k1) (−E[θ|s2 = k2, s1 = k1]− z + l1) = −g(k2|s1 = k1) δ(k2, k1),
(6)
and hence from equations (4), (5), and (6), sign
(
∂k1
∂k2
)
= sign (δ(k2, k1)) . Next, we sign δ,
establishing its monotonicity properties:
dδ(k2, k1(k2))
dk2
=
dE[θ|s2 = k2, s1 = k1(k2)]
dk2
=
∂E[θ|k2, k1(k2)]
∂k2
+
∂E[θ|k2, k1(k2)]
∂k1
∂k1
∂k2
=
∂E[θ|k2, k1(k2)]
∂k2
− ∂E[θ|k2, k1(k2)]
∂k1
(
∂∆(s1; k2)
∂s1
∣∣∣∣
s1=k1
)−1
∂∆(k1; k2)
∂k2
=
∂E[θ|k2, k1(k2)]
∂k2
+
∂E[θ|k2, k1(k2)]
∂k1
g(k2|s1 = k1) δ(k2, k1)
∂∆(s1;k2)
∂s1
∣∣
s1=k1
, (7)
where the third equality follows from equation (5) and the fourth from equation (6). Both
∂E[θ|k2,k1]
∂k1
and ∂E[θ|k2,k1]
∂k2
are positive because s1, s2, and θ are affiliated; and
∂∆(s1;k2)
∂s1
∣∣
s1=k1
> 0
from equation (4). Thus, dδ(k2,k1(k2))
dk2
> 0 for all δ ≥ 0, which implies that δ(k2, k1(k2)) has
a single-crossing property as a function of k2. Next, we show δ changes sign from neg-
ative (strategic substitutes) to positive (strategic complements). From equation (3) and
A1, limk2→−∞ k1(k2) < ∞, and hence limk2→−∞ δ(k2, k1(k2)) = −∞. Finally, we show that
limk2→∞ k1(k2) > −∞. Suppose not, so that limk2→∞ k1(k2) = −∞. Then,
lim
k2→∞
∆(k1(k2), k2) = lim
k2→∞
Pr(s2 ≥ k2|s1 = k1(k2))E[θ|s2 ≥ k2, s1 = k1(k2)]− (h1 − l1)
≤ lim
k2→∞
Pr(s2 ≥ k2|s1 = k1(k2)) E[θ|s2 ≥ k2]− (h1 − l1)
≤ lim
k2→∞
Pr(s2 ≥ k2) E[θ|s2 ≥ k2]− (h1 − l1) < 0, (8)
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where the first equality follows from the fact that if limk2→∞ k1(k2) = −∞, then limk2→∞ Pr(s2 ≥
k2|s1 = k1)(z − l1) = 0. The last inequality follows from the following observation:
lim
k2→∞
Pr(s2 > k2) E[θ|s2 > k2] = lim
k2→∞
∫ ∞
θ=−∞
θ
(∫ ∞
s2=k2
pdf(θ, s2) ds2
)
dθ
= lim
k2→∞
∫ ∞
θ=−∞
θ
(∫ ∞
s2=k2
pdf(s2|θ) ds2
)
pdf(θ) dθ
=
∫ ∞
θ=−∞
θ
(
lim
k2→∞
∫ ∞
s2=k2
pdf(s2|θ) ds2
)
pdf(θ) dθ
=
∫ ∞
θ=−∞
θ × 0 dθ = 0.
We can move the limit inside since substituting |θ| for θ and 1 for ∫∞
s2=k2
pdf(s2|θ) ds2 yields:∫ ∞
θ=−∞
θ
(∫ ∞
s2=k2
pdf(s2|θ) ds2
)
pdf(θ) dθ ≤
∫ ∞
θ=−∞
|θ| pdf(θ) dθ = E[ |θ| ] <∞.
Inequality (8) a contradiction because ∆(k1(k2), k2) = 0. Thus, limk2→∞ k1(k2) > −∞,
and hence limk2→∞ δ(k2, k1(k2)) = limk2→∞E[θ|s2 = k2, s1 = k1(k2)] =∞. 
Lemma A.3. Assumption A2 holds with an additive, normal noise signal structure, si =
θ + νi, where θ, ν1 and ν2 are independently normally distributed with θ ∼ N(0, σ20) and
νi ∼ N(0, σ2i ).
Proof of Lemma A.3: For i ∈ {1, 2}, let bi = σ20/(σ20 + σ2i ), ai =
√
(1 + bi)σ2i , and
Σ = σ20σ
2
1 + σ
2
0σ
2
2 + σ
2
1σ
2
2. Then,
E[θ|ki, sj ≥ kj] = biki + σ
2
0σ
2
i ai
Σ
φ(xi)
1− Φ(xi) , (9)
where xi = (kj − biki)/ai and φ(x) and Φ(x) are pdf and cdf of standard normal distribu-
tion, respectively. Let A(x) ≡ ∂
∂x
φ(x)
1−Φ(x) . Moreover, A(x) ∈ (0, 1) (Sampford 1953). Thus,
Assumption A2 holds if and only if(
1− σ
2
0σ
2
1
Σ
A(x1)
)(
1− σ
2
0σ
2
2
Σ
A(x2)
)
b2b1 >
(
σ20σ
2
2
Σ
A(x2)
)(
σ20σ
2
1
Σ
A(x1)
)
.
That is,
b1b2
(
1− σ
2
0σ
2
1
Σ
A(x1)− σ
2
0σ
2
2
Σ
A(x2)
)
> (1− b1b2) σ
2
0σ
2
1
Σ
σ20σ
2
2
Σ
A(x1)A(x2). (10)
30
Next, observe that
b1b2 =
σ40
(σ20 + σ
2
1)(σ
2
0 + σ
2
1)
, and hence 1− b1b2 = Σ
(σ20 + σ
2
1)(σ
2
0 + σ
2
1)
. (11)
Substituting (11) into (10) and rearranging yields
Σ− σ20σ21 A(x1)− σ20σ22 A(x2) > σ21σ22 A(x1)A(x2),
which is true because A(x) ∈ (0, 1), and hence
Σ− σ20σ21 A(x1)− σ20σ22 A(x2) > Σ− σ20σ21 − σ20σ22 = σ21σ22 > σ21σ22 A(x1)A(x2). 
Proof of Proposition 1: From the proof of Lemma 2 recall that limk1→+∞ k2(k1) = −∞,
limk1→−∞ k2(k1) is finite, and limk2→+∞ k1(k2) > −∞. Thus, the continuity of k1(k2) and
k2(k1) implies that they cross, at least once.
Next, we prove uniqueness for the case where l1 = h1. Then, the vanguard best response
satisfies E[θ|k1, s2 ≥ k2] = l1 − z, and hence, for the vanguard’s best response,
∂k1(k2)
∂k2
= −
(
∂E[θ|k1, s2 ≥ k2]
∂k1
)−1
∂E[θ|k1, s2 ≥ k2]
∂k2
. (12)
Next, consider the citizen. His best response satisfies E[θ|s1 ≥ k1, k2] = w2. Similar calcu-
lations for the citizen’s best response yields
∂k2(k1)
∂k1
= −∂E[θ|s1 ≥ k1, k2]
∂k1
(
∂E[θ|s1 ≥ k1, k2]
∂k2
)−1
. (13)
To prove uniqueness, it suffices to show that the vanguard’s best response curve in (k1, k2)-
space, for all relevant k1s, always has a sharper negative slope than the citizen’s. That is,
the inverse of (12) is a larger negative number than (13), i.e.,
−∂E[θ|s1 ≥ k1, k2]
∂k1
(
∂E[θ|s1 ≥ k1, k2]
∂k2
)−1
> −∂E[θ|k1, s2 ≥ k2]
∂k1
(
∂E[θ|k1, s2 ≥ k2]
∂k2
)−1
.
Due to affiliation all terms are positive, and hence rearrangement yields
∂E[θ|s1 ≥ k1, k2]
∂k1
(
∂E[θ|k1, s2 ≥ k2]
∂k2
)
<
∂E[θ|k1, s2 ≥ k2]
∂k1
(
∂E[θ|s1 ≥ k1, k2]
∂k2
)
,
which holds by Assumption A2. If h1 > l1, then the slope of the strategic substitute seg-
ment of the vanguard’s best response becomes even more negative. Thus, if a crossing
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happens on the strategic substitutes segment of the vanguard’s best response, it is unique.
Finally, clearly, crossing can happen only once on the strategic complements segment of the
vanguard’s best response. 
Proof of Proposition 2: From equation (3), ∂∆(k1;k2,z)
∂z
= Pr(s2 ≥ k2|s1 = k1) > 0.
Thus, ∂k1(z)
∂z
= −
(
∂∆(k1;k2,z)
∂k1
)−1
∂∆(k1;k2,z)
∂z
< 0 at any best response cutoff k1, including the
equilibrium cutoff. Moreover, since the citizen’s best response exhibits strategic substitutes
(Lemma 1), his equilibrium cutoff decreases in z, 0 < ∂k2(k1(z))
∂z
. 
Proof of Proposition 3: Let E[U2|k1, k2] be the citizen’s ex ante expected utility given
equilibrium cutoffs k1 and k2. Then
dE[U2|k1, k2]
dz
=
(
∂E[U2|k1, k2]
∂k1
+
∂E[U2|k1, k2]
∂k2
∂k2
∂k1
)
dk1
dz
=
∂E[U2|k1, k2]
∂k1
dk1
dz
, (14)
where we use ∂E[U2|k1,k2]
∂k2
= 0 because k2 is the citizen’s equilibrium cutoff. Moreover,
E[U2|k1, k2] = Pr(s1 < k1)h2 + Pr(s1 ≥ k1, s2 < k2)w2
+Pr(s1 ≥ k1, s2 ≥ k2) E[θ|s1 ≥ k1, s2 ≥ k2]
= Pr(s1 < k1)h2 + w2
∫ ∞
s1=k1
∫ k2
s2=−∞
f(s1, s2)ds1ds2
+
∫ ∞
s1=k1
∫ ∞
s2=k2
E[θ|s1, s2]f(s1, s2)ds1ds2,
where f(s1, s2) is the joint of s1 and s2. Let h(·) be the pdf of s1, and recall that g(·|s1) is
the pdf of s2 conditional on s1. Hence,
∂E[U2|k1,k2]
∂k1
=
h(k1) h2 − w2 h(k1)
∫ k2
−∞
g(s2|k1)ds2 − h(k1)
∫ ∞
k2
E[θ|s1 = k1, s2] g(s2|s1 = k1) ds2
= h(k1){h2 − w2Pr(s2 < k2|s1 = k1)− Pr(s2 ≥ k2|s1 = k1)E[θ|s2 ≥ k2, s1 = k1]} (15)
= h(k1)
{
h2 − w2 + Pr(s2 ≥ k2|k1)
(
E[θ|s1 ≥ k1, s2 = k2]− E[θ|s1 = k1, s2 ≥ k2]
)}
. (16)
We proceed in a number of steps. First, substituting limk1→∞ k2(k1) = −∞ into (15) reveals
that ∂E[U2|k1,k2]
∂k1
< 0 for k1 sufficiently large. Thus,
dE[U2|k1,k2]
dz
> 0 for sufficiently negative z,
implying that z∗ > −∞. Second, since E[θ|s1 ≥ k1, s2 = k2] = w2 and limk1→−∞ k2(k1) is
finite, limk1→−∞E[θ|k1, s2 ≥ k2] = −∞ and limk1→−∞E[θ|s1 ≥ k1, k2] = w2. Substituting
these limits into (16) reveals that when h2 = w2,
∂E[U2|k1,k2]
∂k1
> 0 for sufficiently negative
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k1. Therefore, when h2 = w2,
dE[U2|k1,k2]
dz
< 0 for all sufficiently large z, i.e., z∗ < ∞ when
h2 = w2. Third, h2 does not affect k1 or k2. Thus, if Pr(s2 ≥ k2|s1 = k1)E[θ|s2 ≥ k2, s1 = k1]
is bounded from below as we vary z, then, from (15), ∂E[U2|k1,k2]
∂k1
is always negative for suf-
ficiently negative h2 (holding w2 fixed). Therefore,
dE[U2|k1,k2]
dz
is always positive, and hence
z∗ = ∞. Moreover, assumption A1(c) implies Pr(s2 ≥ k2(k1)|s1 = k1)E[θ|s2 ≥ k2(k1), s1 =
k1] is bounded from below for all z. To see this, note that limk1→−∞ k2(k1) = k ∈ R, and
hence limk1→−∞ Pr(s2 ≥ k2|s1 = k1)E[θ|s2 ≥ k2, s1 = k1] ≈ limk1→−∞ Pr(s2 ≥ k¯|s1 =
k1)E[θ|s2 ≥ k¯, s1 = k1] > −∞ where the last inequality follows from A1(c). Fourth, from
(15), ∂E[U2|k1,k2]
∂k1
rises in h2 because h2 does not affect k1 or k2. Hence, z
∗ falls with h2. Thus,
there exists h¯ ∈ R such that z∗ is finite if and only if h2 > h¯.
Next, we derive z∗ when it is finite. Because k1 is the vanguard’s equilibrium cutoff,
Pr(s2 ≥ k2|s1 = k1)E[θ|s2 ≥ k2, s1 = k1] = h1 − l1Pr(s2 < k2|s1 = k1)− Pr(s2 ≥ k2|s1 = k1)z.
Substituting for E[θ|s2 ≥ k2, s1 = k1] from this equation into (15) yields 1h(k1)
∂E[U2|k1,k2]
∂k1
=
h2 − w2Pr(s2 < k2|s1 = k1)− h1 + l1Pr(s2 < k2|s1 = k1) + Pr(s2 ≥ k2|s1 = k1)z
= (h2 − h1)− (w2 − l1)Pr(s2 < k2|s1 = k1) + Pr(s2 ≥ k2|s1 = k1)z. (17)
Combining equations (14) and (17) yields
dE[U2]
dz
=
dk1
dz
h(k1) [(h2 − h1)− Pr(s2 < k2|s1 = k1) (w2 − l1) + Pr(s2 ≥ k2|s1 = k1) z].
Solving this first-order condition yields the result in the proposition. 
Proof of Proposition 4: Let E[U1|k1, k2] be the vanguard’s ex ante expected utility given
cutoffs k1 and k2:
E[U1|k1, k2] = Pr(s1 ≥ k1, s2 ≥ k2) (E[θ|s1 ≥ k1, s2 ≥ k2] + z)
+Pr(s1 ≥ k1, s2 < k2)l1 + Pr(s1 < k1)h1
= Pr(s1 ≥ k1)
∫ ∞
s2=k2
(E[θ|s1 ≥ k1, s2] + z) g(s2|s1 ≥ k1)ds2
+Pr(s1 ≥ k1)Pr(s2 < k2|s1 ≥ k1)l1 + Pr(s1 < k1)h1. (18)
In equilibrium, k1 and k2 are best responses, and hence
∂E[U1|k1,k2]
∂k1
= 0. Moreover, from
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Lemmas A.1 and A.2, only k2 explicitly depends on w2. Thus,
∂E[U1|k1(k2(w2)), k2(w2)]
∂w2
=
∂E[U1]
∂k2
∂k2
∂w2
+
∂E[U1]
∂k1
∂k1
∂k2
∂k2
∂w2
=
∂E[U1]
∂k2
∂k2
∂w2
.
It is easy to see that ∂k2
∂w2
> 0, and hence the first order condition, ∂E[U1|k1(k2(w2)),k2(w2)]
∂w2
= 0,
holds if and only if ∂E[U1]
∂k2
= 0. From equation (18),
∂E[U1]
∂k2
= −Pr(s1 ≥ k1) (E[θ|s1 ≥ k1, k2] + z) g(k2|s1 ≥ k1) ) + f(k2|s1 ≥ k1) Pr(s1 ≥ k1) l1
= Pr(s1 ≥ k1) g(k2|s1 ≥ k1) (l1 − z − E[θ|s1 ≥ k1, k2]).
Thus, ∂E[U1]
∂k2
= 0 if and only if E[θ|s1 ≥ k1(k2(w2)), k2(w2)] = l1− z. Moreover, from Lemma
A.1, E[θ|s1 ≥ k1(k2(w2)), k2(w2)] = w2. Thus, the first order condition holds if and only if
w2 = l1−z. It is easy to see that this is a maximum. Thus, ∂E[U1]∂k2 = 0 if and only if E[θ|s1 ≥
k1(k2(w2)), k2(w2)] = l1− z. Moreover, from Lemma A.1, E[θ|s1 ≥ k1(k2(w2)), k2(w2)] = w2.
Thus, the first order condition holds if and only if w2 = l1− z. It is easy to see that this is a
maximum. Thus, the vanguard wants to choose c such that w2−c = l1−z, i.e., c = w2−l1+z.
Clearly, when we restrict c to be positive, c = max{w2 − l1 + z, 0}. 
Proof of Proposition 5: Let Ev be an agent’s expectation when the agent believes that
var(θ|s1) = v. By assumption, Ev[θ|s1 ≥ k1(k2(w2 − c)), k2(w2 − c)] is decreasing in v.
The equilibrium level of k2 is (uniquely) determined by Ev2 [θ|s1 ≥ k1(k2(w2 − c)), s2 =
k2(w2−c)] = w2−c, where we have made explicit that k2 depends on w2−c. From Proposition
4, the vanguard’s optimal choice is to pick a c that yields a k2(w2−c) that satisfies Ev1 [θ|s1 ≥
k1(k2(w2− c)), s2 = k2(w2− c)] = l1− z. Because these expectations are increasing in s2, the
vanguard’s optimal c is increasing in v2 − v1. Clearly, if v1 = v2, then w2 − c = l1 − z. 
Proof of Proposition 6: Citizen 1’s expected net payoff from revolting versus not revolting
at date 1 when he receives signal s1 and citizen 2 sets cutoffs α, β and γ is:
Pr(s2 ≥ min{α, β}|s1) E[θ|s1, s2 ≥ min{α, β}] + Pr(s2 < min{α, β}|s1)l
−Pr(s2 ≥ α|s1) max{w,E[θ|s,s2 ≥ α]} − Pr(s2 < α|s1) v, (19)
where v > l is the expected continuation payoff to citizen 1 if neither citizen initiates revolt
at date 1, and we note that v = h is always an equilibrium, supported by beliefs that there
will be no revolt at date 2, if there is none at date 1.
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At a symmetric equilibrium, optimization by citizen 1 requires that when s1 = α, he be
indifferent between actions:
Pr(s2 ≥ min{α, β(α)}|s1 = α)[E[θ|s1 = α, s2 ≥ min{α, β(α)}]− l] + l
= Pr(s2 ≥ α|s1 = α)[max{w,E[θ|s1 = α, s2 ≥ α]} − v] + v, (20)
where best-responding when citizen 2 revolts for signals s2 ≥ α means that β(α) solves
E[θ|s2 ≥ α, s1 = β(α)] = w. (21)
The left-hand side of (20) is citizen 1’s expected payoff if he revolts at date 1 following
signal s1 = α. With probability Pr(s2 ≥ min{α, β(α)}|s1 = α), citizen 2 revolts too—
either at date 1 or date 2—and the revolution succeeds, yielding an expected payoff of
E[θ|s1 = α, s2 ≥ min{α, β(α)}] from citizen 1’s perspective. With the remaining probabil-
ity, citizen 2 does not revolt, and citizen 1 gets l. The right-hand side captures citizen 1’s
expected payoff if he does not revolt at date 1. With probability Pr(s2 ≥ α|s1), citizen 2
initiates revolt at date 1. At date 2, citizen 1 revolt if his expected payoff from revolting
E[θ|s1 = α, s2 ≥ α] exceeds that of not revolting w. With the remaining probability, no one
revolts at date 1, and both citizens receive v.
If β(α) ≥ α, then equation (20) becomes
Pr(s2 ≥ α|s1 = α)[E[θ|s1 = α, s2 ≥ α]− l] + l
= Pr(s2 ≥ α|s1 = α)[max{w,E[θ|s1 = α, s2 ≥ α]} − v] + v.
A contradiction immediately obtains since v > l, and max{w,E[θ|s1 = α, s2 ≥ α]} ≥
E[θ|s1 = α, s2 ≥ α]. Hence, α > β(α), and equation (20) becomes
Pr(s2 ≥ β(α)|s1 = α)[E[θ|s1 = α, s2 ≥ β(α)]− l] + l
= Pr(s2 ≥ α|s1 = α)[max{w,E[θ|s1 = α, s2 ≥ α]} − v] + v.
Next use E[θ|s2 ≥ α, s1 = β(α)] = w together with α > β(α) to see that max{w,E[θ|s1 =
α, s2 ≥ α]} = E[θ|s1 = α, s2 ≥ α]. Thus, equation (20) becomes
Pr(s2 ≥ β(α)|s1 = α)[E[θ|s1 = α, s2 ≥ β(α))]− l] + l
= Pr(s2 ≥ α|s1 = α)[E[θ|s1 = α, s2 ≥ α]− v] + v, or equivalently,
Pr(s2 ≥ β(α)|s1 = α) {E[θ|s1 = α, s2 ≥ β(α))]− l} − Pr(s2 < α|s1 = α)(v − l)
= Pr(s2 ≥ α|s1 = α) {E[θ|s1 = α, s2 ≥ α]− l}. (22)
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To establish that there exist (α∗, β(α∗)) that satisfy equations (21) and (22), first observe
that β(α) is continuous and strictly decreasing in α, with limα→−∞ β(α) > −∞, and
limα→+∞ β(α) = −∞. Thus, there exists a unique αβ such that β(αβ) = αβ. Further,
so long as v > l, at αβ, the left-hand side of (22) is less than the right-hand side; and,
as α → ∞, the left-hand side goes to infinity, while the right-hand side goes to zero. By
continuity, there exists (α∗, β(α∗)) that satisfies equations (21) and (22).
When γ < α is a posited cutoff for revolt in the second date given that no one revolted
in the first date, equilibrium demands that
Pr(s2 < γ|s1 = γ, s2 < α) l + Pr(s2 ≥ γ|s1 = γ, s2 < α) E[θ|s1 = γ, γ ≤ s2 < α]
= Pr(s2 < γ|s1 = γ, s2 < α) h+ Pr(s2 ≥ γ|s1 = γ, s2 < α) w.
Substitute in for w = E[θ|s1 ≥ α, s2 = β(α)] and re-arrange:
Pr(s2 ≥ γ|s1 = γ, s2 < α) { E[θ|s1 = γ, γ ≤ s2 < α]− E[θ|s1 ≥ α, s2 = β(α)] }
= Pr(s2 < γ|s1 = γ, s2 < α) (h− l) > 0.
For the left-hand side to be positive, it must be that
E[θ|s1 = γ, γ ≤ s2 < α] > E[θ|s1 ≥ α, s2 = β(α)]. (23)
Since α > γ is necessary for a revolt at date 2 when there is no revolt at date 1, the symmetry
of f(s1, s2) then implies that for (23) to hold, we must have α > γ > β(α).
It remains to verify that at the equilibrium level of α
Pr(s2 ≥ β(α)|s1) {E[θ|s1, s2 ≥ β(α))]− l} − Pr(s2 < α|s1)(v − l)
− Pr(s2 ≥ α|s1) {E[θ|s1, s2 ≥ α]− l}
is positive for all s1 > α, and negative for all s1 < α. Equivalently, we must sign
Pr(β(α) ≤ s2 < α|s1) E[θ|s1, β(α) ≤ s2 < α]
+ Pr(s2 < β(α)|s1) (l − v)− Pr(β(α) ≤ s2 < α|s1) v, which we rewrite as
Pr(β(α) ≤ s2 < α|s1) (E[θ|s1, β(α) ≤ s2 < α]− v)− Pr(s2 < β(α)|s1) (v − l), (24)
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which is equivalent to signing
[E[θ|s1, β(α) ≤ s2 < α]− v]− Pr(s2 < β(α)|s1)
Pr(β(α) ≤ s2 < α|s1) (v − l). (25)
Case I: Constant v. The bracketed term increases in s1. The last term falls with s1.
To see this, let A ≡ Pr(s2 < α|s1) and B ≡ Pr(s2 < β|s1), so that Pr(s2<β|s1)Pr(β≤s2<α|s1) = BA−B .
differentiating with respect to s1 yields
B′(A−B)−(A′−B′)B
(A−B)2 =
B′A−A′B
(A−B)2 , which is negative if and
only if B
′
B
< A
′
A
. Thus, a sufficient condition for B
A−B to be decreasing in s1 for all α and β
with β < α is that ∂
∂x
∂Ln[Pr(s2<x|s1)]
∂s1
> 0, i.e., ∂
∂s1
∂Ln[Pr(s2<x|s1)]
∂x
= ∂
∂s1
PDF (s2=x|s1)
CDF (s2=x|s1) > 0. But
this follows from our assumption that s1 and s2 are affiliated, i.e., they have the monotone
likelihood ratio property.
Case II: non-constant v. Dropping dependence on α
v =
{
h ; s1 < γ
Pr(s2 < γ|s1, s2 < α) l + Pr(γ < s2|s1, s2 < α) E[θ|s1, γ < s2 < α] ; s1 > γ,
which one can rewrite as
v =
{
h ; s1 < γ
Pr(s2<γ|s1) l+Pr(γ<s2<α|s1) E[θ|s1,γ<s2<α]
Pr(s2<α|s1) ; s1 > γ.
We have shown that a necessary condition for v 6= h, is β < γ < α. Rewrite (24) as
Pr(β ≤ s2 < α|s1) E[θ|s1, β ≤ s2 < α] + Pr(s2 < β|s1) l − Pr(s2 < α|s1) v,
and then substitute for v into this expression to obtain
Pr(β ≤ s2 < α|s1) E[θ|s1, β ≤ s2 < α] + Pr(s2 < β|s1) l
−
{
Pr(s2 < α|s1) h ; s1 < γ
Pr(s2 < γ|s1) l + Pr(γ < s2 < α|s1) E[θ|s1, γ < s2 < α] ; s1 > γ,
,
Then, if s1 > γ, the above expression becomes
Pr(β ≤ s2 < α|s1) E[θ|s1, β ≤ s2 < α] + Pr(s2 < β|s1) l
− Pr(s2 < γ|s1) l − Pr(γ < s2 < α|s1) E[θ|s1, γ < s2 < α]
= Pr(β ≤ s2 < γ|s1) (E[θ|s1, β ≤ s2 < γ]− l).
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Hence,{
Pr(β ≤ s2 < α|s1) (E[θ|s1, β ≤ s2 < α]− h)− Pr(s2 < β|s1) (h− l), ; s1 < γ
Pr(β ≤ s2 < γ|s1) (E[θ|s1, β ≤ s2 < γ]− l) ; s1 > γ,
,
We have established that the first line for s1 ∈ R has a single crossing property. The second
line, obviously has that too, and hence, if is has a solution, then it is unique. Further, payoffs
are continuous at s1 = γ, implying a unique solution in s1. That a solution exists follows
from the limiting properties of the expectations as s1 → ±∞. 
Proof of Proposition 7: Index cutoffs in the exogenous and endogenous settings by ex
and en, respectively, so that k1 = αex and k2 = βex. In both settings, the best response
function following a revolt at date 1 is the same: βex(·) = βen(·). Thus, βex(αex) < βen(αen)
if and only if αex > αen. Moreover, in the exogenous setting,
Pr(s2 ≥ βex|s1 = αex) E[θ|s1 = αex, s2 ≥ βex] + Pr(s2 < βex|s1 = αex) l = h, (26)
which has a unique solution by Proposition 1. In the endogenous setting,
Pr(s2 ≥ βen|s1 = αen) E[θ|s1 = αen, s2 ≥ βen] + Pr(s2 < βen|s1 = αen) l (27)
= Pr(s2 ≥ αen|s1 = αen) E[θ|s1 = αen, s2 ≥ αen] + Pr(s2 < αen|s1 = αen) v > h.
The left-hand sides of (26) and (27) are equal when evaluated at the same α, but the right-
hand side of (27) exceeds that of (26) because v ≥ h and E[θ|s1 = αen, s2 ≥ αen] > E[θ|s1 =
βen, s2 ≥ αen] = h. When evaluated at αen, the left-hand side of (26) exceeds the right-hand
side. Moreover, from Proposition 1, the left-hand side of (26) crosses h from below at a
unique point αex, and hence αex < αen. 
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